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List Systems.
54. In §§ 22-25, I discussed, with the aid of the method
of least squares, the problem of partitioning a given num-
ber of seats among three parties in proportion to their
strengths. I had not then seen any mathematical discus-
sions of this problem ; but I have since obtained a copy
of a paper published in 1910 by M. A. Sainte-Lague, Pro-
fesseur de Mathematiques speciales au Lycee de Douai
(and now of Besan9on), in which he gives a discussion of
the problem for any number of parties by the same
method. (-^) The volume in which this paper is published
is not accessible to many students in this part of the world,
and I have therefore made a summary of M. Sainte-
Lague's results.
I use the notation of § 25 of my own paper, as corrected
in the erratum slip.
55. Each elector, says M. Sainte-Lague, has the right
to be represented by a fraction of a deputy given by
ml V = 1/ Q. If he belongs to the party A, he is repre-
sented by the fraction x/]} of a deputy; whence the error
in representation for him is seen to be x / jj — m/v. For
the electors of the various parties, there are errors
«i> ^2» ^3' •••^s. The various methods diverge from one
another in the ways in which they endeavour to make these
errors as small as possible.
56. To arrive at the best rule, M. Sainte-Lague applies
the method of least squares.
For each elector of party A the error in representation
X m
The sum of the squares of the errors for the p electors
of this party is
—
'% - v)
and the sum of the squares of the errors for all v electors
(*") La irp resfi)itation J) rojwrtionnelle et la methode des moindres carres.
Annates Scientifiques de rEcole Normale Sup«irieure, He. serie, tome 27,
December, 1910, pp. 5:30-542. M. Sainte-Lague has given a more popular
account of his results in the Revue Generale des Sciences pares et appliquees
of 30th October, 1910, pp. 846-852 ; and the " rule of least squares " is
stated in a communication made to the Academy of Sciences of Paris on
8th August, 1910.
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whence it can be shown that
—
ni-
p V
The quantity to be made a minimum is, then, S (^^'V/^). M,
Sainte-Lague suggests a geometrical solution similar to
the method used by me for three parties, but gives the-
following practical solution for any number of parties.
The identity
—
^- = 1 + 3 - 5 + ... -r (2a - 3) -f (2.r - 1)
shows that the sum to be made a minimum is the sum of
the X first numbers of (1), the y first numbers of (2), &c.
;
X, y, z being chosen so that the m smallest numbers are-
selected :—
(i>
(2).
As the same result would be obtained by inverting all
these numbers and choosing the m largest we have the
following rule:—
Rule of least squares: Divide p, q, r ... by the odd
integers 1, 3, 5 ..., and in the various series of quotients,
so obtained select the largest, until m have been obtained..
Party .4 receives as many members as the number of
quotients taken from its series; and so with the other-
parties.
57. Next, consider only positive errors {i.e., errors for
electors who are over-represented). If the error for each
elector of party A is positive, this party has at least
X + 1 seats {X + 1 being the whole number next greater
than X^^). According as the seats obtained are X + 1.,
X 4- 2, ..., the error for each elector of .4 is^
—
JC + 1 m X + 2 m
1
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there are I seats left, these seats will be distributed
according to the I smallest of these numbers, or according
to the I largest of the numbers
—
X +1.' X ^ 2 r i- i' r + 2 ' z + 1
If we notice that the numbers
—
f^ i\ ^^ iL. V, (I, i, >% . . /•,
1 '2 3 • • X 1 2 ' • r 1 z • •
'
each greater than those that follow in the same series,
may be considered as corresponding to the seats already
allotted, we are led to the rule of D'Hondt, of which the
statement is the same as the rule of least squares, with
the substitution of the consecutive integers 1, 2 3, 4 .. as
divisors in place of the odd integers 1, 2, 3, ...
58. If we consider only negative errors {i.e., errors for
electors who are under-represented), and limit ourselves to
cases in which the parties have at least X, 7, Z ... members,
negative errors will occur for such of the lists as do not
get any more seats, and we have therefore to choose for
the allotment of the remaining seats the smallest of the
numbers
}> V
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60. M. Sainte-Lague then passes to methods which are
based on the consideration, not of the error for each
elector, but of the error for each member ; a less valid
basis, as he considers, for the apportionment of seats. A
member should represent vl'tn = Q electors; if he has been
elected by party A he represents pjx, whence the error for
him is pIx — vjm,.
Applying the method of least squares to these errors,.
M. Sainte-Lague finds that if each party secures at least
one member, the seats are to be allotted by using divisors
whose approximate values are 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 ...,
one seat having been allotted to the largest party before
applying the rule.
If, in place of considering the error for each member,,
we consider the error for each party {x — jmijv), the
method of least squares leads us to the rule of the largest
remainders, also known as the Swiss rule.
Finally, M. Sainte-Lague applies several tests to com-
pare the rule of least squares with the rule of D'Hondf,
and concludes that the former rule leads to fairer results
than the rule of D'Hondt.
61. For the assistance of those who may wish to become
acquainted with the views of French and Belgian writers
on the principal rules proposed in recent years for par-
titioning seats among parties district by district, I have
compiled the following list of references to the various
rules. These are the principal rules; but there are many
others, and these may be found in the reports of MM.
Benoist and Groussier.
Systeme des moyennes, or rule of Dietz, adopted in the
Projet de loi portant modificatiov aux lots organiques sur
V election des Deputes, passed by the French Chamber of
Deputies in July, 1912. (Each party gets, in the first
place, as many seats as it has whole quotas of votes, the
quota being the number of votes in the district divided
by the number of seats. If there is a seat unallotted, th©
number of votes for each list is divided by one more than
the number of seats already allotted, and the seat is given
to the list which gives the largest quotient, and so for
any other unallotted seats.) Groussier, p. 27 et sqq.
Lachapelle, pp. 114-6.
D'Rondt rule (systeme du diviseur electoral). Benoist,
pp. 19, 43 et sqq. Flandin, pp. 11 et sqq. Goblet
d'Alviella, pp. 5-8. Lachapelle, pp. 94-98, 107-117,,
208-217. La Chesnais Ch. VII. and App. I. Macquart,
pp. 548-551. Moch, passim. Sainte Lague, p. 534 et sqq.
(see § 57 above). Van den Heuvel.
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Hagenbach-Bischoff rule or systeme Genevois (used in
the Canton of Geneva and in the town of Basel) (the Droop
quota vl{m + 1) + 1 is used as divisor; if any seats
remain unallotted, v/(m + 2) + 1 is used as divisor; if
any still remain v/(m + 3) + 1 is the divisor; and so on).
Macquart, pp. 551-4. Lachapefle, pp. 117-9.
System of the electoral quota (quotient electoral), unal-
lotted seats going to the largest parties. (The quota is the
number of votes in the district divided by the number
of seats). Groussier, p. 28 et sqq. This system was used
in the Neuchatel electoral law of 1894, article 64
(Benoist, p. 126.)
System of the electoral quota (quotient electoral), unal-
lotted seats going to the parties with largest remainders.
Groussier, p. 28 et sqq. Macquart, 546-9. Sainte-Lague,
pp. 537-8 (see § 60 above). Lachapelle, pp. 103-107.
Moch, §§ 5-13.
System of the electoral quota (quotient electoral), unal-
lotted seats going to the parties for which the ratio of the
remainder to the strength of the party is largest (methode
des phis fortes fractions). Sainte-Lague, p. 535 (see § 58
above).
System of M. Maurice Equer (in which seats are par-
titioned so that the difference between the greatest and
least of the quantities xjp—see § 55—may be as small as
possible). Equer. Groussier, p. 33 et sqq. Sainte-Lague,
p. 535 (see § 59 above).
Methode des nioindres carres (see § 56 above). Sainte-
Lague, p. 531 et sqq.
Van de Walle's syste^n (system of the electoral quota
;
remainders added together in a group of districts and
remaining seats allotted by applying D'Hondt rule to the
totals of the remainders). Lachapelle, pp. 221-230. Van
de Walle, pp. 1-30. Goblet d'Alviella, pp. 13-15. Van
den Heuvel.
General discussions of the problem will be found in
—
Groussier, pp. 22-51.
Sainte-Lague, pp. 529-542.
Macquart, pp. 545-554.
The works referred to above by authors' names are as
follows :—
Benoist, Charles (Depute). Rapport fait au nom de la
commission du suffrage universel chargee d'examiner
diverses propositions de loi tendant a. etahlir la repi'eseti-
tation jM'oportio7inelle. Chambre des Deputes, Annexe au
proces-verbal de la seance du 7 Avril, 1905. (Chamber
of Deputies, No. 2376 of 1905.)
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Equer, Maurice. Arithmetique et rejyresentation 'pro-
portions elle. Supplement a la Grande Revue de 25 Juin,
1910.
Flandin, Etienne (Depute). Rapport fait an nom de
la comrnission du suffrage uiiiversel chargee d' examiner
les propositions de loi : 1'^ de 31 . Dansefte; 2^ de 31 . Louis
Martin ei plusieurs de ses coUegues; 3° de 31. 31assahuau;
4"^ de 31. Etienne FJandin (Tonne), tendant a l' etablisse-
ment du scrutin de liste avec representation jJ^oportion-
nelle dans les electio7is a la Chamhre des Deputes.
Chambre des Deputes, Annexe au proces-verbal de la
seance du 22 Mars, 1907. (Chamber of Deputies, No. 883
of 1907.)
Goblet d'Alviella, M. le Comte Felix. Quelques con-
siderations sur la representation proportionnelle. Extrait
de la Revue de Belgique. (Bruxelles : Societe anonyme
M. Weissenbrucli, Imprimeur du Roi, 1910.)
Groussier, Arthur (Depute). Rapport fait du nom
de la commission du suffrage universel chargee d' examiner
le projet de loi et di verses propositions de loi portant
modification aux lois organiques sur V election des deputes
et tendant a etahlir le scrutin de liste avec reprtsentation
proportionnelle. Chambre des Deputes, Annexe au proces-
verbal de la Ire seance du 16 Mars, 1911. (Chamber of
Deputies, No. 826 of 1911.)
Lachapelle, Georges (Secretaire general du Comite
repub]icain de la R.P.). La representation proportion-
nelle en France et en Belgique. (Paris: Felix Alcan,
1911.)
La Chesnais, P.-G. La representation proport iotmelle
et les partis politiques. (Paris: Georges Bellais, 1904.)
Macquart, Emile (Secretaire general de la Ligue pour
la Representation proportionnelle). Examen critique des
divers procedes de repartition proportionnelle en matiere
electorale. Revue Scientifique, 5e serie, tome iv., 28 Octo-
bre, 1905, pp. 545-554.
Moch, Gaston. La rejTresentation rraiment proportion-
nelle. Collection de la Grande Revue. (Paris: Edouard
Comely et Cie, 1910.)
Sainte-Lague, A. (Professeur au Lycee de Douai). La
representation proportionnelle et la methode des moindres
carres. Annales scientifiques de I'Ecole Normale Superi-
«ure, 3e. serie, tome 27, December, 1910, pp. 530-542.
Van den Heuvel, Jules. Le mecanisme de la representa-
tion proportionnelle. Extrait de la Revue Generale,
fevrier, 1911. (Bruxelles: Goemaere. 1911.)
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Van de Walle, Victor. La Representation proporfion-
nelle integralement appliquee aux elections legislatives :
Proposition de loi (avant-projet). (Bruxelles : Imprim-
erie du Progres- V. Feron, 1910.)
List Systems—The Method of the Uniform Quota.
62. Finally, it remains to ])oint out that the
problem of apportioning seats among parties arises
from fixing before the election the number of seats
for each constituency. The problem can be avoided, and
a partition of seats among parties as exact as the size of
the legislature allows can be secured, if the number of
seats in the legislature is fixed, but the number of seat&
for each constituency is determined after the polling by
the number of votes polled in it. On this idea is based
the system of le nombre imique, or the uniform quota—
a system supported by the late Professor Ilenri Poincare
and other French mathematicians as the only exact method
of proportional representation, i"^*^'^)
63. Hare proposed to use for the quota the number
obtained by dividing the total of the votes throughout the
country by the number of members in the House of Com-
mons. He also proposed that the whole country
should be one constituency ; a proposal which, with
other notions contained in his works, is usually thought
to have kept back for a generation the progress of pro-
portional representation in England. The same quota is
used in the system of le nombre unique; but the country
is divided into districts, as in other systems of proportional
representation, and these may be equal or unequal, as may
be convenient. The system assumes that the same parties
will contest the election in many districts or throughout
the country ; it would break down if there were many iso-
lated candidatures, but these are not to be expected when
the party system has become established.
The votes for all the candidates of each party through-
out the country are totalled, and then the total number of
votes for all parties is obtained. This total is divided
by the number of members to be elected, and the result is
le nombre unique, or the uniform quota.
The total number of votes for each party is then divided
by the quota. The quotient so obtained is the share of
representation of the party. If the sum of the quotients
(**•) See not." (*"«), § 73.
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is not equal to the number of members to be elected, the
remaining seats can go to the parties with the largest
remainders, or otherwise as may be thought fit ; it matters
little how the remaining seats are dealt with if the House
is at all large. The proportion of seats to voters in each
party can thus be made as exact as the number of members
will allow.
Next, the number of votes for each party in each district
is divided by the quota, and members equal in number
to the quotient so obtained are selected from the candi-
dates of the party in that district. The total number of
seats allotted to a party in the various districts will be less
than the total number of seats to which it is entitled, for
in some or all of the districts there will be remainders. The
unallotted seats are then given to the districts v/ith the
largest remainders. Each party's share of representation
in each district has now been ascertained. It only remains
to choose the members for the party in eacli district from
the candidates of the party in the district; the candi-
dates to be chosen will be those of the party who are
highest on the poll.f^ob)
64. As an example, let us apply the system of the uni-
form quota to the Tasmanian General Election of 23rd
January, 1913. The first choices (with the single trans-
ferable vote) obtained by the parties were as follow -.—
General Elecii Tasmania, 2Srd Jan van/,
for the Parties.
1913.— Fo^e*
District.
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I assume that these numbers represent the relative
strengths of the parties. With a party-list system, as
each elector would have several votes, the numbers would
be multiples of these (subject to a slight disarrangement
of the votes in Wilmot) ; but these numbers will serve foi
4:he illustration.
We first divide the total number of votes polled, 68,767,
by the number of members to be elected, 30; the result is
the quota, 2292.
The total of the votes for each party is then divided
by 2292; the results are, Liberal, 15-78; Labour, 13-79;
Independent, 0'43. The members to be allotted to the
parties are therefore Liberal, 16; Labour, 14; Independ-
•ent, (which, it may be noticed, was the result given by
the single transferable vote).
Next divide the totals of the votes for the parties in the
various districts by the quota. The results are:—
'General, Election^ Tasmania, 23rd January, 1913.
—
Share
of Representation in each District according to the
Method of the Uniform Quota.
District.
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General Election, Tasmania, 2?>rd January, 1913.
—
Result
according to the Method of the Uniform Quota.
District.
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Multiple Transferable Vote Systems.
66. In these systems a voter gives equal votes to a num-
ber of candidates less than the number of members to be
elected, and marks other candidates in an order of pref-
erence. The name " multiple transferable vote "
describes such systems ; but they might also be called
"limited vote systems with preferential voting."
67. To appreciate the relation of the multiple transfer-
able vote to other systems used in many-membered con-
stituencies, the following arrangement of these systems
in order of development will be useful :—
(a) The single non-transferable vote. This is used
in Japan. (^^).
(b) The single transferable vote.
(c) The limited vote, in which an elector gives
equal votes to a number of candidates
less than the number of members to be
returned. The limited vote was used in
England from 1867 to 1885 in thirteen three-
member constituencies and one four-member
constituency. (^^)
(d) The limited vote with preferential voting, or
the multiple transferable vote.
(e) The block vote, or scrutin de Jiste, in
which an elector votes for as many candi-
dates as are to be elected. This is the sys-
tem used for the Federal Senate. The block
vote (with the modification that the elector
might vote for fewer than the number to be
elected) was used in Tasmania for the House
of Assembly from 1856 to 1870 in one five-
member constituency and one three-member
constituency, and from 1885 to 1896 in eight
two-member constituencies.
Of these, the single transferable vote gives approxi-
mately proportional representation (§§ 6-21); the single
untransferable vote and the limited vote give representa-
tion to minorities, but not in proportion to their strengths
;
while the multiple transferable vote, with suitable rules,
gives, as is shown below, the same approximation to pro-
portional representation as the single transferable vote.
(") See .1. JI. llaui])hre}S, Pniixirt'ntittil Hcprcfcnt atio/i {}^o\u\ox\. 1!)11)
pp. 28:3-y.
(") Benoist (s«'e§Gl) collectis otliei- instances of the use of tlie limited
vote ([). 13).
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68. As an example of the multiple transferable vote^
let us take a contest in a six-member district between
two parties each nominating six candidates, in which each
voter has three first choices, and second, third and fourth
choices; and let us suppose that there is neither cross-
voting between the parties nor short-voting within a party .
The first stage of the scrutiny will be to count
the first choices obtained by each candidate. The
total of these for all candidates will be three
times the number of voters. The quota will be
one-sixth (if the Hare quota is used) or one-seventh
(if the Droop quota is used) of the total number of first
choices; i.e., three-sixths (Hare) or three-sevenths (Droop)
of the number of voters. Some candidates will have sur-
pluses above the quota, and there must be rules for trans-
ferring these: when all surpluses have been transferred,
there may be one or more seats unfilled, and there must
be rules for excluding the candidates lowest on the poll
and distributing their votes.
Various sets of rules have been proposed. To illustrate
the importance of the differences between the rules, let
us take an extreme case based UDon the following ballot-
papers (A, B, C, D, E, F being supposed to be the candi-
dates of one party)
—
1 A D
1 B
Fl i"
^ h
F [C
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Let us suppose that A, B, C are the candidates of one
section, and D, E, F the candidates of another section,
of the same party ; the supporters of the lirst section give
a first choice to each of A, B, C, and their subsequent
choices to the candidates of the second section (as in the
first ballot-paper) ; the supporters of the second section
give their first choices to D, E , F , and their subsequent
choices to A, B, C (as in the second ballot-paper).
Let us further suppose that this party has two-thirds
of all the voters, and is therefore entitled to four out of
the six members; and that on making up the totals of the
first choices, A, B, C are found to have each just a quota
(either Hare or Droop) ; that all but three of the candi-
dates of the other party have been excluded ; and that
Z>, E, F each have fewer votes than the three remaining
candidates of the other party. There will, then, be just a
quota of papers marked like the first ballot-paper ; and
the other ballot-papers for the party will be marked like
the second ballot-paper.
A, B, C having just a quota each, there are no votes
to be transferred from them, and D, E , F get no benefit
from the second, third, and fourth choices given to them
on the quota of papers on which A, B, C have first choices.
D, E, F being lowest on the poll, one of them has to be
excluded ; let it be D. Suppose that the rules provide {~^)
that the vot€S of an excluded candidate are to be divided
among the candidates having second or next available
choices on the papers on which the excluded candidate
has a first choice. On /9's papers, the second, third, and
fourth choices have been given only to candidates who
are already returned. Consequently there is no candi-
date available to receive /)'s votes; and all of his votes
are lost. One of E, F, say E, is now lowest on the poll;
his votes cannot be transferred and are also lost ; finally
the votes of the third candidate F are lost. We are left,
then, with three elected candidates of the party we have
been considering and three candidates of the other party.
The other party, numbering only one-third of the voters,
and so entitled only to two members, thus gets three.
The failure to obtain proportional representation has
arisen in this case because there were no candidates to
(^) The rules of the " Launceston Voting System " for pre-electioM
contained in The Tajfrna/tif/n Workers' Political League Election Manv%l
(Tasmanian ;-Jews Pi-intinji Works, Hol)arr, 1912) have this ju'cvision.
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whom (with the rules supposed) the votes of the excluded
candidate could be transferred. With the single transfer-
able vote (and no cross-voting or short-voting), an
excluded candidate's votes can always be transferred if
there is another candidate of the same party unelected,
but in the cases just considered, although E, F are still
unelected, the rules do not permit of />'s votes going to
them.
69. The following table shows the representation which
the Launceston Voting System may give to a party having
60 per cent, of the voters in a two-party contest in a six-
member district. In the cases in which disproportional
representation is shown to be possible, it should be remem-
bered that the assumptions necessarv for these cases are
not likely to be realised very frequently.
Multiple Transferable Vote according to the Launceston
Voting System in a Six-Member District—Possible
Representation of a Party having 60?^^ of the Voters,
and so entitled, to Four Members.
Nuuibn- of First
Choices allowed Members Returned.
to each Elector.
4 The party must get four members.
If three members are returned each with
just a quota, the partv may fail to return
a fourth (see §68); totars.
3 If two members are returned each with
just a quota, the party may return only
one more; total 3.
If one member is returned with just a quota,
the party will get three others; total 4.
The party must get four members.
70. Disproportional representation through a division
of a party into two sections (as in the cases just considered)
can be avoided if the rules provide that on the distribu-
tion of a surplus or of the votes of an excluded candidate
the votes skall go to the other candidates having first
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choices on the same papers if there are no candidates avail-
able with second or subsequent choices. (^*)
In the case supposed in § 68, neither A, B, or G are
available, and JJs> votes would be divided between K
and F.
If E and F were still lowest on the poll, one of them
would be excluded, and his votes (including those he had
obtained from D) would go to F , who would have all the
first choices given to D, E , and himself. Thus no votes
would be lost, and the party, if the total of the first choices
polled for D, E, F entitled it to another seat, would get
the seat.
Let us suppose, then, that we have rules which pro-
vide for the transfer of a vote so long as there is an vinex-
cluded candidate, whether with a first choice or a subse-
quent choice, marked on the same paper. (^^) With such
rules no votes are lost by a party, and it will be found
that the argument in regard to the single transferable
vote contained in §§ 6-21 is applicable. Either the Hare
quota or the Droop quota will give representation approxi-
mately proportional, and the Droop quota will be prefer-
able to the Hare quota.
(*•) There is an objpcti'Mi to such a rule, liowever, at all events in pre-
elections. One of the reasons for preferring the multiple transferable vote
to the single transferable vote in an election such as the pre-election of the
candidates of a party is that with the single vote a section as small as the
quota (one-seventh), and possibly out of sympathy with the rest of the
party, may return a candidate who will stand for the party as a whole ;
whereas with the multiple vote, the quota (if there are three first choices)
is three-sevenths, and the rules are intended to prevent the return of any
candidate with less than a quota of supporters. If D, E, F are the candi-
dates of a small section, and if i>'s votes go to E, and ^'s to F, F has as
many votes as if each voter of the section had given him three first choices,
and so a section as small as one-seventh is enabled to return a candidate.
C^) A set of rules providing for all possible cases would be rather
complicated. The scrutiny, too, would be difficult. Mr. J. H. Humphreys
(Minutes of Evidence taken hefore the Boyal Commission, on Systems of
Election, Stationery Office, Lcmdon, 1910, Cd. 5352, at p. 40) has pointed
out that counting of votes is more laborious when there are several votes on
a paper than \«hen there is only one. " Whenever the ballot-paper (as in the
Belgian syst«m and with the single transferable vote) represents but one
vote only, the process of counting consists of snorting papers according to
the votes given, and then in counting the heaps of papers so formed.
Whenever there is more than one vote recorded upon a ballot-paper it be-
comes necessary to extract the particulars of each vote upon recording
sheets." With the multii)le transferable vote and fractional transfers,
fractional values add a further complication. These difficulties are avoided
in the I-aunceston Voting System of the Labour Party in Tasmania, in
which no choice can have a fractional value.
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Single Transferable Vote Systems.
71. The argument in §§ 6-21 has been restated more
fully and clearly by Mr. F. W. Barford, of Melbourne,
in a paper A Study in Proportional Rejyrcsentation read
at the meeting of the Australasian Association for the
Advancement of Science held in Melbourne in January,
1913.
Close Contests.
72. In a note to § 4, I collected some information as
to the frequency of close contests. Students interested in
this aspect of representation will find further information
in the following papers in the Journal of the Royal Statis-
tical Society :—
John Biddulph Martin: Electoral Statistics: A Review
of the Working of our Representative System from 1832
to 1881, in view of Prospective Changes therein. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, March, 1884 (XLVII.,
75-115).
J. A. Baines : Parliamentary Representation in Eng-
land, illustrated by the Elections of 1892 and, 1895.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, March, 1896
(LIX., 38-118). Table D shows the distribution of seats
according to the majority per cent, in 1892 and 1895
;
Table G the percentage of the majority in each constituency
at these elections.
F. Y. Edgeworth : Miscellaneous Applications of the
Calculus of I^rohahilities. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, September, 1898 (LXI., 534-544).
Sir Richard Biddulph Martin: The Electoral " Sudng
of the Pendulum." Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, December, 1906 (LXIX., 655-707).
Single-Member Constituencies.
73. It is well known that single-member constituencies
usually fail to give proportional representation to parties,
and sometimes put a minority in power. (-^). But it is
commonly said that this defect will be remedied if the
(*») The case against the single-membei- system is stated by .J. H.
Humphreys {Propnrtionnl Reprene/itation {London, VJll), Ch. v.); and
by Professor J. R. Commons, in his Prirport tonal lleprestutation (2nd
edition. New York, 1907) at pp. .36-85, his illustrations being taken mainlj
fi-om elections in the United States.
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constituencies are approximately equal in electoral popula-
tion and if members are elected by a system of preferential
voting ensuring that the candidate returned has received
votes from a majority of the electors (as in the elections for
the Legislative Council in Tasmania). The following
paragraphs will show that equality of constituencies and
an absolute majority system are insufficient to secure even
that the majority in the country shall have a majority in
the House, to say nothing of a majority proportional to
its strength. (-'''^)
(**) Mr. L. F. Giblin, M.H.A., has pointed out to me that it is possible
even with proportional representation for the minority in the country to
win a majority of seats. With proportional representation the total rep-
resentation of each party depends to some extent (though to a much less
extent than with single-member districts) on the distribution of the
strengths of the parties among the disuicts. If members are allotted to
parties district by district, the representation, although proportional as
nearly as possible in each district, may become disproportional for the
country as a whole. The only sure way to secure exactly pioportional
representation is to allot seats in proportion to votes throughout the
country, as in the method of the uniform quota. Mr. Giblin writes :
—
" It should be noted that proportional voting with (he single transferable
vote may result in putting a minority in povvec, and, when the number of
constituences is small, the chance is not a remote one. In Tasmania
under the present system, in which the Droop quota is used, assume that
the quotas are the same in each division. Let party A return 16 members
and party B 14 members. There being 35 quotas in the five districts, the
14 members for party B will represent a majority in the country if B's
votes are more than 17 i quotas, i.e., if the sum of its remainders is more
than 3^ quotas. If B's votes are more than 17^ quotas, A's are less than
17^, and the sum of its remainders is less than 1^. That is party A (the
minority in the country) will get a majority in Parliament if the votes not
absorbed as quotas are divided between the parties A and B in less than
the ratio 3:7. In practice, the parties are fairly equally divided and no
party is likely to be lepresented in any division by less than two members
out of six. Within the range thus indicated, it may be assumed approxi-
mately that any remainder from to one quota is equally likely to occur.
On these conditions, the chance of a majority of 16 members being
returned by a minority of voters may be stated roughly as 1 in 14. That
is to say, in every 14 elections in which the result was 16 to 14, there
would be on an average one in which the minority of the voters returned
the majority in Parliament. This, however, is but a small matter compared
to the case in which 16 members are returned on each side, when the odds
are more than 2 to 1 that one party is entitled to an additional member.
If the number of members was altered to 7 in each district, making 35
members in all, this high probability of disproportional representation
would be removed, but tlie chance of a majority of 18 to 17 being returned
by a minority of voters would, under the same assumptions as above, be
nearly 1 in 4, It should be noted that this possibility of disproportional
representaticm, though not uf^gligible, is small c<>mj)ared to the possibilities
with singkvmember districts, and that it is equally present in the different
List systems, excepting <mly the List system with the Uniform Quota, by
which ])r()portional repiesentation is made certain under all circumstances
so far as the number of members will allow."
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74. The following is an investigation of the conditions
in which the larger of two nearly equal parties may get
only a minority of seats in a country divided into single-
member constituencies. It is assumed that in each dis-
trict there are only two parties each with one
candidate, or that if there are more than two candidates a
system of preferential voting is used to secure that the
candidate returned has received votes from an absolute
majority of the voters; and that the constituencies are
equal in the number of voters.
Let .S^ be the party which has less than half of the votes
polled throughout the country, and let L be the party
which has more than half; and let the strengths of S, L
throughout the country be (50 - a) % and (50 + a) %.
Let there be 100 constituencies and v voters in each.
Consider the constituencies in each of which S has a
majority, and consequently wins the seat; let there be x
of these, and let the average strength of *S^ in them be
(50 + s)%. Consider also the constituencies in which L
has a majority ; let there be y of these, and let the aver-
age strength of I in them be (50 + I) %.
Then, considering the total number of votes obtained
by S, we have
:
50 + .S , 50-/ ^O-rr ,^^
100 100 100
or
.^0 + , ^ 50-/
+
~T7^. • y = ^0-rt (1)100 100
Similarly, from L's votes we get
—
5()-« .'0 + /
Also
—
X + y = 100. (3)
Subtracting (1) from (2), we get
—
ly - sx ^ 100a (4)
The condition for equal representation of the larger and
smaller parties [x = y — 50) is
I - s = 2a. (5)
As an example, let the average strength of ^S* in the dis-
tricts in which it is in a majority be 51 %, and let the aver-
age strength of L in the districts in which it is in a
majority be 57 %, and let the average strengths of the two
parties throughout the country be 47 %, 53 %. The values
of s, /, a are then s = 1, / = 7, o = 3, and I - s = 2a.
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Then we have
51 43 ,.
. X -4- ?/ = 4/
IdO KJO
and
49 57
100 100^
whence 2x — 14: y = 600.
Also X + y = 100.
From these equations we find x = y = 50 ; i.e., the repre-
sentation of the parties is equal, and there is a deadlock
in the House, in spite of the 6 % majority which L haa
over S in the country.
If I — s > 2a, we can see from (4) that x > 50, i.e.,
the smaller party gets a majority of the seats.
Thus, if the average strength of S in the districts in
which it has a majority is 51 %, and the average
strength of L in the districts in which it has
a majority is just over 57 %, S, the smaller party, will
get more seats than L, the larger party, and so the smaller
party will have a majority over the larger in the House,
although the larger has a majority of over 6 % above
the smaller in the country.
75. J. R. Commons ("^) gives the following illustration
of a distribution of votes which would give the smaller
party the majority of seats. A country is divided into
40 districts, and in each of these 5500 electors vote. In
25 districts the smaller party obtains 2800 votes, and the
larger 2700 votes ; in 15 districts, the smaller party obtains
2000 votes and the larger 3000 votes. The votes polled
are, then
:
Smaller Party.
2800 in 25 districts 70,000
2000 in 15 districts 30,000
100,000
Larger Party.
2700 in 25 districts 67,500
3500 in 15 districts 52,500
120,000
(Vi^ Proporfioual Rrvi'cxi'ufatlon, 2n(l edition (New Yoi-k. 1011), pp.
48-49.
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The smaller party thus obtains 25 seats with only
100,000 votes, while the larger party with 120,000 votes
obtains only 15 seats.
76. Professor Edgeworth {^^) has shown that in the
general elections of 1886, 1892, and 1895 in Great Britain
the ratios, fnumber of Unionist supporters) 4- (number of
Unionists and number of Gladstonians) in the various
constituencies, were distributed about an average in accord-
ance with the normal law of error. Such a distribution
will give a majority to the larger party in the House which
will be a greater percentage of the House than the
strength of the larger party in the country is of the total
number of electors, as appears from a comparison of the
actual result of these elections with the percentages of
representation calculated from the curve of error repre-
senting the distribution.
The Right Hon. J. Parker Smith, in his evidence before
the British Royal Commission on Systems of Election f^^),
gives reasons why the majority is usvially exaggerated if
single-member constituencies are used. He mentions a
calculation by Major Macmahon, who has shown that if
in a two-party contest the voters are in the ratio of A
to B, then the members elected may be expected to be at
least in the ratio of .4^ to B^. Thus if the strengths of the
parties are 55 % to 45 % (A : B = 11 : 9), the members may
be expected to be in the ratio of IP to 9'', or nearly 2 to
1; i.e., a party with 5 % more than half the electors may
be expected to get nearly two-thirds of the members.
77. Statistics of elections in' single-member constitu-
encies in which the conditions of § 74—approxi-
mate equality between the constituencies in num-
ber of votes, and either only two candidates or else
preferential voting—are fulfilled, are scarce. It is one of
the disadvantages of single-member constituencies, especi-
ally in new countries, that redistribution is required much
more frequently than with grouped districts, and the
sizes of the constituencies are usually by no means equal
when a few years have elapsed since the last redistribution.
Also, the proportion of electors who vote varies largely
from one constituency to another. In Australia at the
{^) Misri'llaneouii Applic itions of the Calculus of Prohahilities,
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, September, 1898 (LXL, 534 544).
('^) Muiutm of Evidence tahfn 'hefov the Boyat Cominiaxion on
Siii^tcms of Election (Stationery Office. London, 1910, Cd. 5352), Question
1253, p. 81.
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House of Representatives election in 1910 (^") the num-
bers of electors enrolled in the constituencies in each State
varied up to about 15 % from the mean for the State.
The number of voters varied even more : leaving out a few
very large and a few very small constituencies, the num-
bers of voters varied up to about 20 % or 25 % from the
mean for the State. These numbers, however, were much
more nearly equal than is usually the case with single-
member districts, and this election is consequently more
suitable as an illustration of the arguments in §§ 73-76
than any other of which I have statistics.
In New South Wales, at this election, there were con-
tests between one Liberal candidate and one Labour can-
didate (or betw^een two such candidates and a third who
obtained so few votes that he need not be taken into
account) in 24 constituencies. In these the Labour candi-
dates polled 245,000 votes and the Liberal candidates
203,000 ; and consequently the Labour party, in proportion
to its strength, was entitled to 13 seats and the Liberal
party to 11. The seats won by the parties were Labour 17,
Liberal 7.
In Queensland, there were contests between one Labour
candidate and one Liberal candidate in each of the nine
constituencies. The Labour ctxndidates polled 89,000
votes and the Liberal candidates 76,000; the members to
which the parties were entitled were consequently 5 to 4.
The seats won by the parties were Labour 7, Liberal 2.
In Victoria, there were contests between one Labour
candidate and one Liberal candidate in 19 constituencies.
The Labour candidates polled 216,000, and the Liberal
candidates 192,000; the members to which the parties
were entitled were consequently 10 and 9 ; and these were
the numbers of seats actually won by the parties.
The results in New South Wales and Queensland, then,
confirm the predictions referred to in § 76, that single-
member constituencies will usually exaggerate the majority
obtained by the larger party In Victoria \he election
gave exactly proportional representation in the 19 con-
stituencies considered. But it is to be noted on the one
hand that a loss by Liberal candidates in Victoria of
only 800 votes, spread over four constituencies in which
their majorities were very small, would have given the
Labour party 14 members and reduced the Liberal mem-
(^°) 8eo Klfcthns. 1010. Statistics relating to the Senate Election ;
the Gen ral Election for the Home of Representatives (&c."). (Papers of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. Xo. 1 of 1910).
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bers to 5 ; and on tlio other hand that a gain of only 700
votes in a constituency in which the Labour majority was
small would have given the Liberal party 10 seats and
the Labour party only 9—that is, a party having only
47 per cent, of the voters would have had a majority of
the seats.
Remark as to the Conclusions of this Paper.
78. In discussing the various methods of proportional
representation noticed in this paper, with the exception
of the method of the uniform quota, I have considered the
result that may be expected to occur in a single district.
But in estimating the probability that an election through-
out the country will give proportional or disproportional
representation, it must be remembered that under- or over-
representation in some districts is likely to be balanced
by over- or under-representation in others, unless the sys-
tem used has been deliberately constructed (as was the
D'Hondt) with the object of favouring one party (the
larger party in that case) ; and consequently that the
result of an election in many districts is more likely to
be in proportion to the strengths of the parties than an
election in one district. (^^^) This qualification, however, does
not apply to the argument against the single-member sys-
tem, in which the country has been considered as a whole.
(=») But see '§73, note («•), by Mr. L. F. Gibliii.
